Intervention in the Yugoslav Civil War: The United Nations\u27 Right to Create an International Criminal Tribunal by Tocker, Barbara M.
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 12
Number 3 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 4
5-1-1994
Intervention in the Yugoslav Civil War: The United
Nations' Right to Create an International Criminal
Tribunal
Barbara M. Tocker
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons,
International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tocker, Barbara M. (1994) "Intervention in the Yugoslav Civil War: The United Nations' Right to Create an International Criminal
Tribunal," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 12: No. 3, Article 4.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol12/iss3/4
Intervention in the Yugoslav Civil War:
The United Nations' Right to Create an
International Criminal Tribunal
I. Introduction
The ongoing and seemingly endless civil war in the territory of the
former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officially began on June 25,
1991, when two republics, Slovenia and Croatia, declared their
independence and provoked the collapse of the nation.' The fighting
republics committed and are still committing countless atrocities,
including murder, rape, torture, and "ethnic cleansing. "2 In response,
the United Nations Security Council (Council) established an
international tribunal to prosecute war crimes perpetrated during the
Yugoslav war.' The tribunal is the first internationally mandated forum
established by the United Nations (UN) to prosecute crimes against
humanity since the Nuremberg trials of top Nazi leaders after World War
II.
This Comment examines the conflict in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia and the reaction to it by the international community. Part
II recounts the history of the country's breakup and its aftermath and
explores the actions the European Community and the UN have taken.
Part III examines the International Tribunal (Tribunal) created to
prosecute violators of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia, focusing on its creation, scope, and functions. Part IV
discusses the Council's bases for intervention in the Yugoslav conflict
and for the creation of the Tribunal, including a consideration of the
Council's actions in Iraq and Somalia and the establishment of other
international military tribunals. Part V examines the effectiveness of the
Tribunal and evaluates other options presently available for the redress
of war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Finally, Part VI analyzes the
arguments for and against establishing the Tribunal and concludes that
1. Roy Gutman, Independence Declared; Slovenia, Croatia Leave Yugoslavia; WarIs Feared,
NEWSDAY, June 26, 1991, at 4.
2. Julia Preston, U.N. Security Council Establishes Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal, Judicial
Panel Is Ist Such Body Since Nuremberg, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1993, at Al. "Ethnic cleansing'
refers to the forced removal of one ethnic group by another. Stephanie Nebehay, UN War Crimes
Experts Investigating 98 Mass Graves, Reuter Libr. Rep., Sept. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, INT'L File.
3. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
4. Preston, supra note 2.
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it is unlikely that the Tribunal will serve the justice it was created to
provide.
II. Background and History
A. Ethnic and Religious Rivalries in Yugoslavia
Prior to the commencement of the current civil war, the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of the six republics of Croatia,
Slovenia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia and
the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina.5 In 1918, the
World War I Allied powers created this multinational state, and from its
inception Yugoslavia was destined for disaster.6 An oppressive Serbian
monarch first ruled the country.' Communist leader Josip Broz Tito
replaced this monarch and reigned for nearly forty years! Tito's death
in 1980 brought about the initial decline of the communist state,9 leaving
the nation without any political organization to hold its diverse territories
together.' ° In 1990, the strength of communism in the region further
diminished when Croatia and Slovenia voted new, non-communist parties
into office." As the influence of communism declined, ethnic and
religious rivalries intensified and ultimately culminated in a vicious civil
war. '
2
The current turmoil throughout the former Yugoslavia represents a
struggle that is neither recent nor surprising. The antagonism between
Serbia and Croatia arose centuries ago at the time of the Ottoman and
Hapsburg empires, which drew the boundary lines between the two
republics. 3 The "centuries-old ethnic and religious differences [among
the republics] that had been kept in check during four decades of
5. Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 570 (1992). The population of the territory is
estimated at 24 million. Id.
6. See David Lawday, Doomed by an AncientDisease, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., May 17,
1993, at 34-35.
7. Id.
8. Gutman, supra note 1. Tito, a Croat, tried to decrease Serbia's power while increasing
his own by turning the various ethnic groups in Yugoslavia against one another. Lawday, supra
note 6, at 35.
9. Pascal Privat & Theodore Stanger, Yugoslavia: Bloodshed in the Balkans, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 9, 1991, at 40.
10. Lawday, supra note 6, at 35.
11. Privat & Stanger, supra note 9.
12. Id.
13. David Lawday & Srdjan Trifkovic, The Fire This Time, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
15, 1991, at 33.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
centralized communist rule" are now finally re-emerging.' 4 Slovenia
and Croatia's predominantly Roman Catholic and Western-oriented
populations are clashing with Serbia's dominant Orthodox Christian
population. 5 There is also a large and volatile Serbian minority in
Croatia who recently declared their union with Serbia, thereby
magnifying the friction.' 6 Furthermore, while the six republics of the
former Yugoslavia are of common Slav origin, the territories share no
other common element of a conventional nation; neither history, religion,
language, alphabet, nor economic status is common to all the
republics." As a result, the once unified Yugoslavia has become a
group of neighboring territories without a mechanism or desire to remain
united.
In recent years, Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia have fought bitterly
about restructuring the former communist federation of Yugoslavia. 8
As communism deteriorated, these rival republics and their freely elected
leaders moved in their own directions. 9 Croatia and Slovenia, which
declared themselves independent on June 25, 1991, campaigned for a
loose association of sovereign states in place of the current federation.2'
At the other extreme, Serbia demanded that Croatia and Slovenia retract
their declarations of independence in order to maintain the tight
federation.2'
In addition, these republics have disputed the control of the
collective presidency, which governed Yugoslavia's federal government
prior to the breakup of the nation.' This Presidency rotated among the
heads of the republics and autonomous territories.' As part of the
14. Ray Moseley, Yugoslav, Slovenia Forces Clash, CHI. TRIB., June 28, 1991, at 1.
15. Gutman, supra note 1. Slovenia has a population of 1.94 million of whom 90% are ethnic
Slovenes and small percentages are ethnic Serbs, Croats, and Hungarians. Weller, supra note 5,
at 569. Croatia has a population of 4.68 million 85% are ethnic Croats and 11.5% are ethnic Serbs.
Id. Serbia has a population of 9.8 million, two-thirds of whom are ethnic Serbs. Id.
16. Gutman, supra note 1. Krajina and Petrinja are two of the regions in Croatia where ethnic
Serbs are predominant. Weller, supra note 5, at 569.
17. Lawday, supra note 6, at 35.
18. Gutman, supra note 1. Other sources of conflict are the disparity in economics, politics,
and religion. Lawday & Trifkovic, supra note 13.
19. Lawday & Trifkovic, supra note 13. Croatia and Slovenia have stronger economies than
Serbia and hoped to rebuild old commercial ties with Western Europe. Lawday, supra note 6, at
35.
20. Lawday & Trifkovic, supra note 13.
21. Id. at 34. Serbian President Milosevic pledged that Serbs will not live in an alien state and
declared that republics with Serbian minorities had to transfer these minority areas to Serbia if they
intended to secede from the country. Id. at 35.
22. Weller, supra note 5, at 569.
23. Id.
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normal rotation of the Presidency, Croat Stjepan Mesic was scheduled to
enter office in May 1991.' Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic
blocked Mesic's entrance into office and refused to accept him as
President of the country, which ultimately incited Croatia to declare
independence .2  However, Milosevic's attempts to keep Mesic out of
office were only temporarily successful. Yugoslavia's federal Presidency
remained vacant only for a brief period, after which the federation
elected Mesic as President.26 On July 8, 1991, shortly before Mesic
was elected, a truce was imposed that brought relative peace to
Slovenia.27  However, the fighting between the Croats and the Serb
rebels in Croatia continued.'
B. The Final Breakup of the Yugoslav State
As the fighting in Croatia escalated, the Bosnians2 9 grew concerned
that Serbia and Croatia would attempt to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Bosnia) between them." Since Bosnia is an ethnic melting pot of
Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, the Bosnians believed that Serbia and
Croatia might decide to appropriate the areas where their ethnic groups
were dominant.3 The Bosnians sought international recognition when
it became clear that Serbian President Milosevic had no intention of
protecting their rights in his quest for a "Greater Serbia."32 In a
referendum on February 29, 1992, an overwhelming majority of Bosnian
Muslims and Croats voted for independence from Yugoslavia, believing
that sovereignty was the only means of preserving their republic.33 On
March 3, 1992, the tiny republic of Montenegro voted to remain in
24. Moseley, supra note 14. In some cases, Mesic is also referred to as "Stipe Mesic" or
"Stepe Mesic." See Gutman, supra note 1; Weller, supra note 5, at 570, 574.
25. Gutman, supra note 1.
26. See Moseley, supra note 14; Weller, supra note 5, at 574.
27. Privat & Stanger, supra note 9.
28. Id.
29. For purposes of this Comment, the term "Bosnians" refers to the inhabitants of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, including Muslims, Serbs, and Croats, unless otherwise specified.
30. Tim Judah, Muslims and Croats Votefor Bosnia Independence, THE TIMES (London), Mar.
2, 1992, at 11.
31. Lawday & Trifkovic, supra note 13, at 35. Bosnia-Herzegovina is 40% Muslim, 32%
Serb, and 18% Croat. Id. The republic has a population of 4.1 million. Weller, supra note 5, at
569.
32. Tom Post et al., Making War on Muslims, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 10, 1992, at 40. The term
"Greater Serbia" refers to Milosevic's plan to join all the areas populated by Serbs in the former
Yugoslavia into one state. See Lawday & Trifkovic, supra note 13, at 35.
33. Judah, supra note 30. About 60% of the electorate voted on the referendum, indicating
the strong support for independence. Id.
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Yugoslavia, holding on to its close ties with Serbia.3  Serbia and
Montenegro formed an alliance that is the basis of the new
Yugoslavia.35
In response to the collapse of Yugoslav unity, Serbian President
Milosevic declared that Serbs from all areas of the former nation had to
join together to form a single Serbian state.36 This prompted the Serbs
to enact their land-grabbing plan for a "Greater Serbia," which involved
carving out areas of Bosnia inhabited primarily by Serbs and annexing
this land for their own republic. Meanwhile, the Croats developed a
similar plan for a "Greater Croatia."' By the Fall of 1992, Bosnia
essentially ceased to exist as a nation after the Serbs and Croats seized
control of large areas of the republic. 9 It seems that Bosnia is destined
to remain a permanently divided nation because the Serbs and Croats
continue to attack Bosnia's remaining Muslim enclaves and refuse to
negotiate the return of the land captured in Bosnia.'
In April 1992, the United States and other nations recognized
Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina's independence."1 As a result,
the territory that once comprised the nation of Yugoslavia was
transformed into five separate entities including the three independent
countries of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina; the remnants of
the Yugoslav state, made up of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro;
and the secessionist republic of Macedonia.42
C. Sanctions and Attempted Relief Efforts
The outbreak of the fighting on June 27, 1991, between Slovenia,
Croatia, and Serbia caught the attention of the international community,
34. Montenegro Votes to Stay in Yugoslavia, Reuter Libr. Rep., Mar. 2, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT'L File.
35. Id.
36. Lawday, supra note 6, at 35.
37. Id. As of March 1993, Serbia's army occupied 70% of Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving only
Sarajevo and isolated areas of the region in the hands of the Bosnian government. Bruce W. Nelan,
More Harm Than Good; Bosnia's Brutal Tragedy Grows Worse While the U.S. and Its Allies Resolve
to Remain Spectators, TIME, Mar. 15, 1993, at 40.
38. Lawday, supra note 6, at 35. The Serbs and Croats succeeded in carving up Bosnia, even
though the Bosnian Muslims outnumbered both Bosnian Serbs and Croats. Id.
39. Stephen Budiansky, When Hope Runs Out, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., May 24, 1993,
at 36, 37.
40. Id. at 36.
41. David Binder, U.S. Recognizes Three Yugoslav Republics as Independent, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1992, at A10. After recognizing the republics, the United States lifted the sanctions
involving economic aid and trade benefits against Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Macedonia. Id.
42. Id.
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in particular the European Community (EC) and the UN. Within
seventy-two hours of Serbia's attack on Slovenia, the EC sent a group of
Foreign Ministers on two missions to Yugoslavia. 43  The Slovenes,
Croats, and Serbs agreed to numerous cease-fires, but the parties did not
comply with their obligations under the agreements." Unfortunately,
a peace conference at the Hague on September 7, 1991, also failed to
stop the fighting in Croatia, even though cease-fire agreements were
renewed.
As the situation deteriorated, the UN Security Council received
requests from some of its members to convene a meeting and take action
in the Yugoslav conflict.46 On September 25, 1991, the Council
responded to these requests and met to discuss the situation in
Yugoslavia.47 At the beginning of the meeting, in an unprecedented
move, the Yugoslav Representative to the UN requested that an embargo
be placed on weapons and military equipment delivered to all parties in
Yugoslavia and that all states refrain from escalating the already
increasing tensions in the nation.48 In response to that request, the
Council passed Resolution 713 and, under its Chapter VII powers,49
established a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons
43. Weller, supra note 5, at 571. The European Community involved itself in the crisis, even
though Yugoslavia was not one of its members. Id. At this point, the name "Yugoslavia" refers
to the nation as it existed prior to the declarations of independence by Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.
44. Id. at 571-77. The first cease-fire agreement, signed on July 7, 1991, provided for the
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Slovenia. Id. at 573; Yugoslavia: EEC Adopts Cautious But
Dogged Stance, Eur. Information Service; Eur. Rep., July 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, EURRPT File. Another attempted cease-fire agreement, on September 2, 1991, called for
a cease-fire in Croatia and specifically provided for the demobilization of Croatian forces, the return
of Yugoslav forces to their barracks, and the deployment of observers to oversee compliance with
the cease-fire. Political Cooperation: Needfor an Agreement on the Cease-Fire in Yugoslavia, Eur.
Information Service; Eur. Rep., Sept. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, EURRPT File.
45. Weller, supra note 5, at 577.
46. Id. See, e.g., Letter Dated 19 September 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of
Austria to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/23052 (1991); Letter Dated 20 September 1991 from the Permanent
Representatives of Hungary to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doe. S/23057 (1991).
47. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3009 (1991) [hereinafter
S/PV. 3009].
48. Id. The sanctions requested refer to the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia.
49. Chapter VI of the UN Charter authorizes the Council to determine the existence of threats
to the peace and then to decide what measures should be taken to restore international peace and
security. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42. These powers are discussed in detail in Part III of this
Comment.
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and military equipment to Yugoslavia in order to establish peace and
security in the nation."
During the next year, the Council implemented three additional
stages of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now
Serbia and Montenegro),5 1 again acting under its Chapter VII powers.
The first stage of sanctions included import and export bans on
commodities and products, refusals to provide financial or economic
resources, bans on aircraft flights from or into the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, and prohibitions on the Federal Republic's participation in
sporting events .52 The second stage established a ban on military flights
in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina to insure the safe delivery of
humanitarian assistance to that area. 3  The third stage included
prohibitions on the transshipment of certain goods through the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and required the inspection of all maritime
shipping moving in and out of the Federal Republic to insure compliance
with previous embargoes.'
In addition to imposing sanctions, the Council implemented
numerous relief efforts aimed at preventing future violence and
destruction. On February 21, 1992, the Council reiterated its concern
that the situation in Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace
and security.5 In order to create an atmosphere suitable for negotiating
a peace settlement, the Council established a UN Protection Force in
accordance with the UN peace-keeping plan.5" Unfortunately, these
protection forces have been unable to suppress the large scale fighting in
many areas, such as Croatia, where the Serbian and Croatian armies have
been involved in conflict.57
50. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991).
51. At this time, the United States and the EC formally recognized the independence of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia now refers primarily to
Serbia and Montenegro. See Binder, supra note 41; supra text accompanying notes 34 and 35.
52. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
53. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3122d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992).
54. S.C. Res. 787, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3137th mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/787
(1992). This provision applies to the embargoes established in resolutions 713 (1991) and 757
(1992). See S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713
(1991); S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3082d mtg. at 3-5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
55. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992).
56. Id. at 2. The purpose of this peace-keeping operation is to "create the conditions of peace
and security" in the former Yugoslavia. U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex 11I at 15-16, U.N. Doc.
S/23280/Annex (1991). UN troops were to designate "Protected Areas" to be demilitarized to
ensure that the people living there were protected from attack. Id.
57. See Jeff Trimble, Into the Valleys of Death, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., June 21, 1993.
at 45-47.
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Since the beginning of the conflict, the UN has made numerous
attempts at implementing cease-fire agreements.5" The Council has
urged strict compliance with these agreements59 and has demanded that
the parties comply with the UN peace-keeping plan in Croatia and with
their cease-fire obligations.' Although the Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians
have signed more than a dozen cease-fire agreements, many violations
have occurred and are still occurring. While the UN continues its
attempts to prevent further fighting and bloodshed in the former
Yugoslavia through sanctions, peacekeeping forces, and cease-fire
agreements, the end of the war does not appear any closer and the goal
of restoring peace to this Slavic region seems an unrealizable dream.
III. The International Tribunal to Prosecute Violations of International
Law in the Former Yugoslavia
A. Creation of the Commission of Experts and the International
Tribunal
As a result of the failed attempts to restore peace and security in the
former Yugoslavia, the Council considered establishing a tribunal to
prosecute the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims for the countless atrocities that
have been and continue to be committed against thousands of civilians
and prisoners-of-war. 6' These crimes involve grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions,62  violations of the Convention Against
58. On October 18, 1991, the Serbs and the Croats agreed to an immediate and unconditional
cease-fire in Croatia. See Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., Annex III at
23, U.N. Doc. S/23169/Annex (1991). Another agreement signed at Geneva on November 23,
1991, provided for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) from Croatia. See Report
of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/23513 (1992). But not long
after it was signed, there were reports that both the Serbs and the Croats were violating the
agreement. Id. Then again, on April 12, 1992, the leaders of the three main parties in Bosnia, the
Croats, the Serbs, and the Bosnians, signed a cease-fire agreement. See Report of the Secretary-
General, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex II at 11, U.N. Doc. S/23836/Annex (1992).
59. S.C. Res. 743, supra note 55. This resolution refers specifically to the cease-fire
agreements signed on November 23, 1991, and January 2, 1992.
60. S.C. Res. 807, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3174th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/807 (1993).
On February 19, 1993, the Council expressed deep concern about the parties' repeated violations
of cease-fire agreements. Id.
61. See Patrick Worsnip, Proposed War Crimes Tribunal Faces Big Hurdles, Experts Say,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 19, 1993, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT'L File; Evelyn Leopold.
U.N. Security Council to Vote on War Crimes Court, Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 21, 1993, available
in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT'L File [hereinafter Vote on War Crimes Court].
62. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of War Prisoners, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
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Genocide,63 and other serious crimes against humanity and the laws of
war.64 Human rights groups have blamed the Serbs in Croatia and
Bosnia for most of the atrocities, but Croat and Muslim forces are by no
means innocent victims.'4
All three ethnic groups have committed crimes including beatings,
killings, rapes, torture, pillage, and the wanton destruction of
property.'4 In addition, they have carried out the policy of "ethnic
cleansing" in Croatia and Bosnia, which is a form of genocide and has
entailed razing cities to the ground, torturing prisoners of war, and
forcibly removing civilians from their homes because of their religious
or ethnic backgrounds.67 Ethnic cleansing has also included the rape of
Muslim women, which constitutes another form of genocide.6'
Despite the international community's increasing knowledge of these
atrocities, two steps preceded 'the creation of the tribunal for the
prosecution of the responsible parties. First, a mechanism for recording
the crimes being committed in the former Yugoslavia was required.
Thus, on October 14, 1992, the Secretary-General established a
Commission of Experts (Commission) comprised of five members to
examine and analyze evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.69 Individual
63. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 278, 28 I.L.M. 763 [hereinafter Convention Against Genocide].
64. Evelyn Leopold, U.N. Council Authorises Yugoslav War Crimes Court, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
May 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT'L File.
65. Vote on War Crimes Court, supra note 61.
66. Id.; Leopold, supra note 64. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 62, art. 3, 6
U.S.T. at 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136, 138; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 62, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288, 290 (prohibiting murder, mutilation, cruel
treatment, and torture of persons taking no active part in the hostilities).
67. See Patrick Worsnip, supra note 61; Leopold, supra note 64. The discriminatory policy
of "ethnic cleansing" is in violation of the Geneva Conventions because it is aimed at people based
upon their religious or ethnic backgrounds. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 62, art. 3,
6 U.S.T. at 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136, 138; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 62, art.
3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3520, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288, 290 (providing that civilians shall be treated
humanely without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith, or any other
similar criteria).
68. Godfrey Hodgson, Whose Justice Is It Anyway?, INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY, Jan. 24,
1993, at 22. Article II of the Convention Against Genocide defines genocide as "causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group" with the intent to destroy a national, ethical, racial,
or religious group. Convention Against Genocide, supra note 63, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 28
I.L.M. at 763-64.
69. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of the Commission of Experts, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/24657 (1992) [hereinafter Commission]. The Secretary-
General created this commission in response to a request by the Security Council in Resolution 780.
Id.
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states, international humanitarian organizations, and other groups began
collecting this information and submitting it to the Commission for
review.7 In addition, the Commission itself began compiling a
database of cases of murder, rape, torture, and "ethnic cleansing."7
After evaluating the gathered information, the Commission will provide
the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave
breaches of international law in the region.72 This evidence may then
be used to prosecute those responsible for the crimes committed.
Second, before actually creating the tribunal, the Council requested
that the Secretary-General submit a report on the possibility of
establishing such a tribunal, including specific proposals and options for
its implementation. In his report on May 3, 1993, the Secretary-
General noted that the normal procedure for establishing an international
tribunal involved an international body drafting and ratifying a treaty."
Nevertheless, because of the lengthy process involved in creating and
ratifying a treaty and the urgency of the situation in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General recommended that the Council
establish the International Tribunal under its Chapter VII powers in the
UN Charter.75
The Council has broad and far-reaching authority under Chapter
VII. However, before using its Chapter VII powers, the Council must
first "determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression."76 The Council may then decide what
measures should be taken in order "to maintain or restore international
peace and security.""
70. Id. See S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/780
(1992); S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/771 (1992)
(calling upon the designated parties to collate information relating to violations of international law
and to provide the evidence to the Commission).
71. Nebehay, supra note 2.
72. Commission, supra note 69, at 2.
73. Id.
74. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter Report]. One advantage to this approach is that
it provides the opportunity to perform a detailed examination of the issues relating to establishing
an international tribunal. Id. at 7. Furthermore, states participating in the negotiations have
sufficient time to decide whether or not they want to become parties to the treaty. Id. The
disadvantage of this procedure is the substantial amount of time required to establish a treaty and
then to obtain the required number of ratifications, Id.
75. Id.
76. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
77. Id. Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter limit the Council's latitude in deciding what
measures are to be taken. Article 41 permits the Council to implement non-military measures in
order to enforce its decisions including, but not limited to, the complete or partial interruption of
economic relations and means of communications and the severance of diplomatic relations. U.N.
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Using this procedure, the Council established a tribunal to maintain
or restore international peace and security.78 The advantage of this
approach was that the Council's decision becomes effective immediately
since all member states are required to carry out decisions made pursuant
to Chapter VII.79 Thus, after two years of violence, bloodshed, and
destruction in the former Yugoslavia, the Council relied on its Chapter
VII powers to create an international tribunal to prosecute those
responsible for grave breaches of international humanitarian law in the
former Yugoslavia in accordance with the Secretary-General's report.'0
B. Functions of the International Tribunal
The preamble to the Statute of the International Tribunal (Statute)
states the objective of the Tribunal as "the prosecution of persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991. ""
Under the provisions of the Statute, the Tribunal has the power to
prosecute persons committing or ordering the commission of grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,' violating the laws or
CHARTER art. 41. Article 42 provides for the use of military action by air, sea, or land if action
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate. U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
78. See Report, supra note 74, at 7.
79. See id.
80. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 3. In addition, the Council adopted the Statute of the
International Tribunal annexed to the Secretary-General's report, which includes provisions on
subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, individual criminal responsibility, and the
organization of the Tribunal. Report, supra note 74, Annex.
81. Statute of the International Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex at 36, U.N. Doc.
S/25704/Annex (1993) [hereinafter Statute].
82. The following acts against persons or property are protected under the Statute:
(a) wilful killing;
(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;
(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power;
(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;
(h) taking hostages as civilians.
Id. art. 2, at 36. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 62, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 62, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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customs of war,83 committing genocide,' or committing crimes
against humanity."
The Statute provides for individual criminal responsibility as
opposed to collective governmental responsibility. Persons planning,
instigating, ordering, committing, or otherwise aiding and abetting in the
planning, preparation, or execution of an aforementioned crime are
individually accountable for their crimes." An accused person's
official position as Head of State or Government does not relieve that
person of criminal responsibility nor does it mitigate his or her
punishment.' Acts committed by a subordinate do not relieve a
superior from criminal responsibility. 8  Moreover, a subordinate acting
pursuant to an order of a Government or superior does not escape
culpability."
83. Violations of the laws or customs of war include but are not limited to the:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering;
(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings;
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion,
charity and education, the arts and science, historic monuments and works of art and
science;
(e) plunder of public or private property.
Statute, supra note 81, art. 3, at 37.
84. Id. art. 4, at 37-38; see Convention Against Genocide, supra note 63, arts. II, III, 78
U.N.T.S. at 280, 28 I.L.M. at 763-64.
85. Crimes against humanity include the following crimes committed in an armed conflict,








(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.
Statute, supra note 81, art. 5, at 38.
86. Id. art. 7, 1, at 38.
87. Id. art. 7, 2, at 39.
88. Id. art. 7, 3, at 39. This accountability is limited to superiors who "knew or had reason
to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators
thereof." Id.
89. Statute, supra note 81, art. 7, 4, at 39. The fact that an accused acted pursuant to
superior orders may be considered in the mitigation of punishment. Id.
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One major difference between this Statute and statutes of earlier war
crimes tribunals is that, in the case of Yugoslavia, the accused may not
be tried in absentia." This change was necessary because trials in
absentia may run counter to the long-settled principles of justice and due
process in national and international law.91  Another significant
difference is that the Tribunal may only impose the penalty of
imprisonment on convicted individuals.' Since the UN has no prisons
of its own, the Statute provides for the imprisonment of convicted
individuals in specific countries. The Tribunal will designate the country
in which a convicted prisoner will serve his or her sentence from a list
of states that have indicated a willingness to accept such individuals.'
IV. Bases for Intervention and the Creation of the International
Tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia
A. The Security Council's Power to Intervene Under the UN Charter
According to the rules of the UN Charter, the Council's actions are
subject to the principle of nonintervention, which prohibits interference
with the domestic affairs of any state.' However, an important
exception to this doctrine provides that the principle of nonintervention
90. Id. art. 21, at 44. Article 21 declares that an accused has the right to be present at the
hearing and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing. Id.
However, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg provided for trials of war
criminals in absentia. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 12, 59 Stat.
1546, 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 290 [hereinafter London Charter].
91. Louis Ren6 Beres, Iraqi Crimes During and After the Gulf War: The Imperative Response
of International Law, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 675, 676 (1993).
92. Statute, supra note 81, art. 24, at 45. The Tribunal may also order the return to the rightful
owner of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct. Id. In contrast, prior war crimes
tribunals had the right to impose death or other just punishment on convicted defendants. See, e.g.,
London Charter, supra note 90, art. 27, 59 Stat. at 1552, 82 U.N.T.S. at 300; International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20, 31.
93. Id. art. 27, at 46. Eligibility for pardon or commutation of sentence is based upon the
applicable law of the state in which the convicted is imprisoned. Id. art. 28, at 46. The Tribunal
will decide whether to grant a pardon or commute the sentence based upon the interests of justice
and general principles of law. Id.
94. Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the
United Nations, 67 IND. L.J. 887, 891-92 (1992). The principle of nonintervention is found in
Article 2 of the UN Charter, which reads:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
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"shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
Chapter VII."9 In essence, this exception permits the Council to enact
measures that interfere with the internal affairs of a state in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.' Whether the
Council would need to rely on this exception for creating the Tribunal,
however, is questionable because the Council's decision that a particular
situation constitutes a threat to the peace, based upon Article 39, implies
that the matter is not a domestic one.'
When contemplating action under the Charter, the Council must
determine first whether the acts under consideration fall within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state. One could argue that human rights
govern the relationship between a government and its citizens and,
therefore, are a purely domestic concern.9 However, it is doubtful that
cases of grave violations of fundamental human rights constitute domestic
matters. In most cases, human rights violations involve threats to
international peace and security" and, therefore, fall outside the
domestic jurisdiction of a state."° For example, persecuted individuals
may try to leave their abusive nations and migrate into. neighboring
states, causing massive immigration problems. In addition, conflicts
themselves may overflow into adjacent states. Consequently, Chapter
VII authorizes the UN to intervene in the internal affairs of a country for
violations of human rights where those violations may jeopardize the
peace and security of other nations. 1°1  Furthermore, the General
Assembly and the Security Council have held that human rights
violations do not constitute matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the state involved because member states are bound by UN
Charter provisions that protect human rights."°
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7.
96. Chapter VII of the UN Charter requires the Council to ascertain threats to the peace and
then to select proper actions to remedy such threats. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
97. DelbrOck, supra note 94, at 892. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7; U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
98. Delbrick, supra note 94, at 892.
99. The phrase "threat to international peace and security" has been interpreted to include
situations that by their nature could potentially become a threat to international peace. See id. at
898.
100. Id. at 892. It should be noted, however, that some analysts believe that there exist grave
violations of fundamental human rights that do not entail direct threats to international peace. See
id.
101. Id. One rationale for the protection of human rights violations under international law is
that certain crimes, when committed under the authority of the state, become matters of international
concern because of the assumed international impact of this behavior. See Beres, supra note 91, at'
677-78.
102. DelbrUck, supra note 94, at 893. Article 1(3) and Article 55 are two provisions of the UN
Charter that protect human rights. Id. Both of these articles provide that the UN should encourage
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1. The Security Council's Intervention Under Chapter VII in Past
Internal Conflicts. -The UN has only invoked Chapter VII of the Charter
and adopted sanctions for grave human rights violations in a few
instances.' The first cases of UN intervention involved the policies
of apartheid in Southern Africa." In these cases, the Council enacted
sanctions against the Ian Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia
(Zimbabwe)"°5 and against the apartheid regime in South Africa."
The Council justified this intervention by characterizing these policies as
"disturbance[s] of international peace" and "threat[s] to international
peace" and security.0 7 However, the UN only characterized these
policies of apartheid, not all grave human rights violations, as threats to
international peace and security entitling intervention under Chapter VII.
The Council's intervention powers then lay dormant until the Iraq-
Kuwait conflict. As a result of both the end of the Cold War and the
newly established consensus among the Soviet Union, the United States,
and other Western powers, the UN was able to take action inside a
sovereign member state, Iraq, to protect minority groups from human
rights violations amounting to acts of genocide. 1 8
On August 2, 1990, the armed forces of Iraq invaded its
neighboring state, Kuwait, and caused extensive casualties." The
worst brutality occurred early in Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. For
instance, the Iraqi invaders ripped off fingernails, shot individuals in the
head, wounded people with axes, drilled holes in kneecaps, filled
intestines with air, burned bodies with acid, cut off ears, and gorged out
eyes."10 In addition, Iraqi soldiers raped Kuwaiti women and Filipino
.respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 3; U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
103. Delbrflck, supra note 94, at 894.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 894 & n.30, 899; S.C. Res. 253, U.N. SCOR, 23d Sess., 1428th mtg. at 5,
U.N. Doc. SIRES/253 (1968) (extending the previous oil embargo of S.C. Res. 221, U.N. SCOR,
21st Sess., 1277th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doe. S/RES/221 (1966), and calling for extensive additional
economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia).
106. See Delbrick, supra note 94, at 894 & n.30, 899; S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess.,
2046th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (1977) (calling for a mandatory arms embargo against
South Africa).
107. Delbrck, supra note 94, at 894, 899.
108. Id. at 888.
109. Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1990, at Al. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claimed that revolutionaries had overthrown
the Kuwaiti Government and that Kuwait had asked Iraq for help. Id. Kuwait, a sovereign state
since its independence from Britain in 1961, has a population of 1.9 million, while Iraq has 17
million inhabitants. Id.
110. Steven Strasser et al., Kuwait: Rape of a Nation, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 1991, at 36.
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housemaids at will."' Aside from the violence against individuals, the
Iraqi occupiers looted Kuwaiti homes, set one-third of Kuwait's oil wells
ablaze, and destroyed hotels, government buildings, and the
parliament. 2
In response, the Council activated its powers under Chapter VII and
passed a series of resolutions in order to restore peace and security in the
region and to expel the Iraqi invaders from Kuwait." 3 On the day of
the initial attack on Kuwait, the Council passed Resolution 660, which
condemned the invasion and ordered Iraq to withdraw immediately and
unconditionally." 4  Four- days later, when Iraq failed to comply with
the demand for withdrawal, the Council again invoked its Chapter VII
powers, ordering all member states to impose strict economic sanctions
against Iraq and to protect the legitimate government of Kuwait. "' On
November 29, 1990, the Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing
member states to use "all necessary means to uphold and implement
resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area," if Iraq failed to
comply by January 15, 1991."6
On January 16, 1991, the allied forces began bombing Iraq and
Kuwait in an effort to liberate Kuwait."' A month later, after
extensive bombing and a massive land attack that left allied forces
occupying part of Southern Iraq, Iraq withdrew its troops from
Kuwait." 8 On March 3, 1991, Iraq notified the UN that it would
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Joseph E. Mayk, Note, Crimes Against Peace: An Analysis of the Nuremberg Prohibition
on Planning and Waging Aggressive War and its Applicability to the Gulf War, 24 RUTGERS L.J.
253, 253 (1992). In this case, there was no question that the Council could intervene under Chapter
VII because the conflict was not internal.
114. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990).
115. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990).
These sanctions included import and export bans and a denial of financial and economic resources
to Iraq. Id.
116. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
The phrase "all necessary means" was not defined, nor was it clear what controls the Security
Council could exercise. Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Nuremberg Principles and the Gulf War, 66 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 711, 723 (1992).
117. Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Gulf: The Overview - U.S. and Allies Open Air War on
Iraq; Bomb Baghdad and Kuwaiti Targets; 'No Choice' But Force, Bush Declares; No Ground
Fighting Yet; Call to Arms by Hussein, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al. Resolution 678
authorized the use of force against Iraq after January 15, 1990, and required the states involved to
keep the Council informed of all actions taken under the resolution. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note
116.
118. Youssef M. Ibrahim, After the War; Iran Organizes and Arms Rebels Fighting Hussein,
Diplomats Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at Al.
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comply with all Security Council resolutions and Iraqi military leaders
accepted the allied terms for ending the Persian Gulf War, including the
prompt return of all prisoners and Kuwaiti civilian detainees. 9 In a
resolution on April 3, 1991, the Council demanded that Iraq recognize
the agreed borders with Kuwait; destroy all its chemical, bacteriological,
and nuclear weapon materials; accept on-site inspections; and renounce
all acts of terrorism. 2°
Although Iraq agreed to end the war, two Iraqi groups were not as
willing to stop the fighting. Shiite fundamentalists and Kurds attacked
the Iraqi loyalist troops.121 Hussein was forced to deflect simultaneous
attacks from the Shiite rebels in the south of Iraq and the Kurd rebels in
the north. 22 In retaliation, Hussein's troops attacked and slaughtered
the rebel fighters, killing many civilians in the process."2
In response to this massacre in Iraq, the Council passed Resolution
688 on April 5, 1991, characterizing the persecution of the Kurds and
other Iraqi civilians as a threat to " international peace and security in the
region. " " The repression of Iraqi civilians led to a massive flow of
refugees across international borders which threatened peace and security
in the region." The Council expressed its deep disturbance with the
magnitude of human suffering and demanded that Iraq stop the
oppression and permit international humanitarian organizations to help
the victims.'26 Without expressly referring to Chapter VII of the
Charter, the Council implied its reliance on Article 39 as the legal basis
119. Identical Letters Dated 21 March 1991 From the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the
United Nations Addressed Respectively to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. S/22370 (1991); Letter Dated 3 March 1991
From the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., at 1-2, U.N. Doe. S/22320 (1991).
120. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 4-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
This resolution also emphasized the goal of establishing a zone in the Middle East free from weapons
of mass destruction and a global ban on chemical weapons. Id.
121. See R.W. Apple, Jr., After the War: The Overview; U.S. Says Iraqi Generals Agree to
Demands 'On All Matters'; Early P.O.W. Release Erpected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1991, at Al
(explaining that the Shiite fundamentalists are religiously opposed to Saddam Hussein, a Sunni
Muslim). See also, Karl E. Meyer, Kurds Are Not Pawns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at A24.
Kurds account for 15% of Iraq's 19 million people. Id.
122. After the War: Iraq; Iraqi Loyalists Pound Shiite Mosques, Rebels Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1991, at A13 [hereinafter After the War]. Iran organized and armed many of the Iraqi rebels
who led the revolt against Hussein" Ibrahim, supra note 118.
123. After the War, supra note 122. For example, Hussein's troops shelled Shiite Muslim
mosques causing the deaths of both Shiite fighters and civilians, Id.
124. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991).
125. Id.
126. Id.
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for its actions under Resolution 688 and its intervention in the internal
conflict. 127
More recently, the Council expanded Chapter VII's application to
impose sanctions for violations of humanitarian law in Somalia. While
the Somalis are a homogeneous people and might be expected to live in
unity, their history has been replete with discord." When Somalia
was colonialized in the late nineteenth century, its borders were defined
and many Somali nomads found themselves citizens of neighboring
Kenya and Ethiopia.'29 In 1960, Somalia was liberated and reunified,
but leaders soon realized they were unable to run a Western democracy
and discontent with the new government increased.1°
In October of 1969, the President was assassinated and Major
General Mohammed Siad Barre imposed a dictatorship. 3' At first, the
Soviet Union supported Siad Barre's regime. However, in 1977, the
Soviets withdrew their aid when Siad Barre invaded Ethiopia, a Soviet
ally.'32 The United States then befriended Siad Barre, sending his
regime significant military assistance and, in return, taking over the old
Soviet military facilities in Somalia.'33 After ten years of military
backing, Siad Barre's massacre of rival clans and politicians caused the
United States to cease providing aid. "
Siad Barre's regime further deteriorated as Somalia's rival clans
joined together to oust the dictator. 5 After three years of civil war
that killed thousands, destroyed much of the country, and sent hundreds
of refugees into neighboring states, Siad Barre fled Somalia in January
127. Delbruick, supra note 94, at 895.
128. Sophfronia Scott Gregory, HowSomalia Crumbled, TIME, Dec. 14, 1992, at 34. Although
the Somalis have similar language and religion, limited natural resources and internal disputes have
created an atmosphere of constant struggle among the various clans in Somalia. Id.
129. Id. At the time of colonization, Britain controlled the northern third and Italy the southern
portion of Somalia. Id. After World War II, parts of Somalia were handed over to Ethiopia to
atone for pre-war European aggression and the remainder of the nation was controlled by Italy. Id.
130. Gregory, supra note 128.
131. Id. Siad Barre's principal goal was to create a Greater Somalia by uniting the nation with
Somali areas of Ethiopia and Kenya. Id.
132. Gerry O'Sullivan, Against the Grain: Another Cold War Casualty, THE HUMANIST, Jan.-
Feb. 1993, at 36, 37. The Soviets provided Siad Barre with heavy artillery that, in turn, was given
to the Somali guerrillas in Ethiopia, who were fighting for rights of secession. Gregory, supra note
128.
133. Gregory, supra note 128.
134. Id. However, the United States had already trained Siad Barre's officers and provided
them with weapons to terrorize rival clans in Somalia. Id. Furthermore, there is evidence
suggesting U.S. complicity in the slaughter as recently as 1990, long after the alleged suspension
of aid to Siad Bane. O'Sullivan, supra note 132.
135. Gregory, supra note 128.
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1991.136 With Siad Barre out of power, the various clans returned to
fighting each other for control of the country, and full-scale war broke
out in November 1991 between factions of the two most prominent
warlords, General Mohammed Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi
Mohammed.' 37 The degree of human suffering as a result of Somalia's
civil war was horrifying as millions of Somalis died because of
widespread famine.'38
On January 23, 1992, the Council determined that the situation in
Somalia, including the massive loss of life and material damage,
constituted a threat to international peace and security because of its
effect on the stability in the region.'39  Citing its Chapter VII
responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the Council
implemented a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of
weapons and military equipment to Somalia.'" ° Then, on April 24,
1992, in response to the deteriorating situation, the Council established
a UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). 1 The goals of the operation
were to monitor the cease-fire agreements, promote political settlement,
and provide humanitarian assistance. On December 14, 1992, the
Council authorized military action and the "use of all necessary means"
under Chapter VII in order to establish a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.'43
One year later, the Council noted with deep regret and concern that
the absence of rule of law continued in Somalia as did violations of
international humanitarian law.'" Under its Chapter VII powers, the
Council emphasized the importance of disarming the Somalis and
demanded that all Somali parties comply with cease-fire obligations.'45
In further response to the armed attacks against UNOSOM personnel by
the United Somali Congress, the Council reaffirmed the Secretary-
136. Id.
137. See id.; The Crisis That the World Ignored: The UN and Somalia, WORLD PRESS REV.,
Oct. 1992, at 11.
138. The Crisis That the World Ignored: The UN and Somalia, supra note 137.
139. S.C. Res, 733, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3039th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733
(1992).
140. Id.
141. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751
(1992).
142. Id.
143. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. SIRES/794 (1992).
144. S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (1993).
145. Id. at 4-5.
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General's power to take action by any necessary means against those
responsible for the armed attacks.146
As these events illustrate, the Council has expanded the use of its
Chapter VII powers to intervene in conflicts previously deemed domestic
matters. These conflicts generally involved internal situations in which
governments committed violations of their own citizens' human rights.
The determination of a threat to international peace and security was on
the one hand based on the actual effects of an internal conflict on
neighboring countries. For instance, often massive refugee influxes
occurred. On the other hand, violations of international human rights,
even when domestic in scope, were viewed as a concern of the
international community. Thus, based on past instances of Council
intervention, it now appears that the Council is authorized to intervene
in an internal conflict in which a government violates the human rights
of its own inhabitants.
2. Invoking Chapter VII in the Yugoslav Conflict.-What began as
an internal dispute among the republics of the former Yugoslavia has
taken on the character of a threat to international peace. 47 This threat
includes not only the suffering of individuals, groups, or peoples within
the former Yugoslavia, but also the dangers to neighboring
territories.148 For example, the Serb-Croat struggle could easily spill
over into a broader regional conflict. If violence were to spread to
Kosovo, the predominantly Albanian province in southern Serbia,
refugees and fighting could cross into Macedonia and Albania.149
Greece and Bulgaria might then renew their rival claims to the Yugoslav
republic of Macedonia, and ethnic Hungarians in the Yugoslav region of
Fojvodina might persuade Budapest to make plans for territorial
adjustments." ° In fact,. the United States, the former USSR, and the
United Kingdom, among other nations, acknowledged the international
dimension of this conflict stemming from refugee flows, energy
shortfalls, and spillovers of fighting into neighboring states and voiced
these concerns to the Security Council.15'
146. S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doe. S/RES/837
(1993).
147.' Delbrtick, supra note 94, at 900.
148. Weller, supra note 5, at 580. A similar analysis was used in the case of the massacre of
Kurds in Iraq. Id. See S.C. Res. 688, supra note 124.
149. Budiansky, supra note 39, at 37.
150. Privat & Stanger, supra note 9, at 41.
151. S/PV.3009, supra note 47, at 53, 57, 59.
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The Council agreed that the fighting in the former Yugoslavia
continued to cause a loss of human life and substantial damage to the
nation, leading to serious consequences for other countries in the region,
in particular, in the border areas of neighboring countries. 2 In
response, the Council passed countless resolutions that imposed sanctions
against the new Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), implemented
numerous relief efforts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and
attempted to enforce cease-fire agreements.'53 However, despite these
efforts, the violence and destruction in the former Yugoslavia continued.
Subsequently, the Council created the International Tribunal, an act it has
never before taken. In fact, no international organization has created an
international tribunal since the allied powers created the Nuremberg
Tribunal after World War II.
Thus, the issue that arises is whether or not the Council was
justified in pursuing these methods of intervention under its Chapter VII
powers.1 The determination of the existence of a threat to the peace
fulfills the Council's duties under Article 39 and invokes the remaining
provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.'55 The Council's
decision that the Yugoslav conflict poses a threat to the peace is
consistent with the Council's determinations in similar situations. In both
the Iraqi and Somali conflicts, as in Yugoslavia, the internal disputes
involved violations of the inhabitants' human rights and had international
implications."' The Council determined that both situations presented
a "threat to the peace" permitting action according to Chapter VII.
By recognizing the international dimensions of the Yugoslav civil
war, the Council determined that the former Yugoslavia's situation was
within the reach of Chapter VII. ' 7 Therefore, the Council was
authorized to take action in order to "maintain or restore international
peace and security" in accordance with Chapter VII's guidelines. The
Council then implemented sanctions and relief efforts and attempted to
enforce cease-fire agreements under the Council's intervention powers.
Since similar measures were taken in Iraq and Somalia, there is little
152. S.C. Res. 713, supra note 50, at 1.
153. See subpart 1(C) of this Comment for a more detailed explanation of the UN's efforts in
the former Yugoslavia.
154. It is important to remember the expansive powers the Council has to "decide what
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions [that
a threat to the peace exists]" and that "it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply
such measures." U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
155. See Delbrck, supra note 94, at 891; Weller, supra note 5, at 579.
156. See previous section for a complete analysis of these two conflicts.
157. See S.C. Res. 713, supra note 50.
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doubt that the Council was authorized to follow this course of action.
However, there is uncertainty as to the propriety of the Council's
creation of an international tribunal, since the UN has never before
created an ad hoc criminal tribunal to prosecute human rights violators.
While the UN has never used its Chapter VII powers to establish an
international criminal tribunal, there is legal justification for the creation
of an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute human rights abusers.158 First, the
Convention Against Genocide specifically allows for an international
tribunal to enforce the provisions of the convention. Article VI of the
Convention provides that trials for violations of the Convention shall be
conducted "by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which
the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may
have jurisdiction."159 Furthermore, the Council has used its Chapter
VII powers in other situations to establish subsidiary organs of the UN
for a variety of purposes." °  For example, in reference to the Iraq-
Kuwait conflict, the Council established a special commission to perform
on-site inspections of Iraq's biological, chemical, and missile capabilities,
attempting to restore international peace and security to the area. 1 In
the case of Yugoslavia, the Council established a subsidiary organ of a
judicial nature as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII' 62
Since the Council must decide what acts should be taken to restore
peace to the former Yugoslavia, the creation of a war crimes tribunal is
consistent with the requirements of Chapter VII and prior Council
actions. 63 Therefore, it may be argued that the Council is authorized
to 'establish an international tribunal to prosecute human rights violators
under the UN Charter. However, in addition to the Charter, there are
two other important bases that give support to the Council's decision to
create the Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia. The first is the precedent
established by the creation of the international military tribunals to
prosecute war criminals in Germany and the Far East. The second is
principles of international law.
158. Beres, supra note 91, at 687.
159. Convention Against Genocide, supra note 63, art. VI, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 282, 28 I.L.M.
at 765.
160. Report, supra note 74, at 8.
161. Id. See S.C. Res. 687, supra note 120, at 5. The other duties of the commission include
carrying out the destruction or removal of chemical and biological weapons and aiding Iraq to
develop a plan for monitoring Iraq's compliance with the resolution. Id. at 5-6.
162. Report, supra note 74, at 8.
163. Id.
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B. The International Military Tribunals in Germany and Tokyo
In 1945, the four Allied Powers; the United Kingdom, the United
States, France, and the Soviet Union; signed the London Agreement,
which created a code of international crimes and an international criminal
court (the International Military Tribunal) for the prosecution of Nazi
war criminals.'" The purpose of the International Military Tribunal
(IMT) was "the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis."165 The London Charter declared
three categories of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal: "crimes
against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity."'" The
creation of the IMT was a significant event because "for the first time,
four of the most powerful nations ... agreed ... upon the principle of
individual responsibility for the crime of attacking international
peace. "167
. The London Charter was not an arbitrary exercise of power, but an
expression of the existing principles of international law and a
codification of the prevailing norms.l"a Declaring that a war crime was
164. The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. The London Agreement, adopted
on August 8, 1945, consists of two parts. Id. The first part called for the establishment of an
International Military Tribunal. Id. The second part, the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, set forth the crimes within the jurisdiction of the court. Id. Nineteen other governments
expressed adherence to the court and its code, including Yugoslavia. The Nuremberg Trial, 6
F.R.D. 69, 76 (1946).
165. London Charter, supra note 90, art. 1, 59 Stat. at 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. at 284.
166. Id., art. 6, 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 286, 288. Article 6 provides for individual
responsibility for the following acts:
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing;
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to . . . murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war . . .
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the
war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether -or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Id.
167. Robert K. Jackson, Statement of Chief U.S. Counsel Upon Signing of the Agreement, 19
TEMP. L.Q. 169, 169 (1946).
. 168. Ferencz, supra note 116, at 714. The London Charter articulated norms that had been
emerging over a long period of time. Id. at 712. In addition, they were supported by a substantial
body of treaties, pacts, conventions, and declarations that proscribed actions similar to those set forth
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a criminal offense was not a novel idea."e9 The Hague and Geneva
Conventions as well as other codes of conduct deemed the commission
of atrocities during wartime a punishable military crime. 7' A crime
against humanity was distinguishable from an ordinary felony or war
crime in that its offensiveness was so great that it shocked the conscience
of mankind.' 7 ' It was a crime against all humanity, not only against
the citizens of an individual state. The Nuremberg trials extended the
scope of this widely recognized crime, holding national leaders
accountable for massive violations of human rights even if committed
against their own citizens. 172
The Nuremberg trials began on November 20, 1945, with twenty-
one of the leading Nazi criminals charged with various crimes set forth
in the London Charter.'73 To insure the fairness of the proceedings,
the courtroom was opened to the public, the prosecution relied on
documentary evidence from captured German archives, and every
accused person was guaranteed an absolutely fair trial. 74 In the
interest of justice, the London Charter permitted accused persons to be
tried in absentia.'75 On October 1, 1946, the trials concluded with
eleven death sentences, seven varying terms of imprisonment, and three
acquittals. 176
in the London Charter. Id.
169. Id. at 713. The IMT held that the specifications of war crimes in the Hague and Geneva
Conventions were declaratory of the laws and customs of war that forbid the mistreatment of
prisoners of war and killings that are not justified by military necessity. Whitney R. Harris, A Call
for an International War Crimes Court: Learning from Nuremberg, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 229, 249
(1992).
170. Ferencz, supra note 116, at 713. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 62, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 62, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287.
171. Ferencz, supra note 116, at 713.
172. Id. The IMT recognized aggression as the supreme international crime and determined that
it would be unjust to permit high-ranking officials to escape punishment merely because no one had
previously been convicted of that offense. See id.; The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 108-10
(1946).
173. Harris, supra note 169, at 244. Twenty-four men were originally indicted, but before the
trial began the court dismissed two of the defendants. Id. at 245. Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und
Halbach was dismissed as too infirm to stand trial and Robert Ley committed suicide. Id. In
addition, the court tried Martin Bormann in absentia, convicted him, and sentenced him to death.
Id. See The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).
174. Ferencz, supra note 116, at 715.
175. Id. at 714; See London Charter, supra note 90, art. 12, 59 Stat. at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at
290.
176. Harris, supra note 169, at 245-46. The three men acquitted were Hans Fritzsche, Franz
von Pappen, and Hjalmar Schacht. Id. For a discussion of the findings and decisions of the IMT
for the accused organizations and individual defendants, see The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69,
147-86 (1946).
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In 1946 a similar international military tribunal was established in
Tokyo for the trial of major war criminals in the Far East. 1'77 This
tribunal was patterned after the Nuremberg Tribunal and applied the
principles of law declared by that court. 17  In November 1948, the
tribunal sentenced seven Japanese wartime leaders to death, and the
leaders were subsequently hanged.' 79
These military tribunals form a strong basis for arguing that an
international body may create an ad hoc criminal tribunal for the
prosecution of war crimes. The Council established the Tribunal to
prosecute individuals for serious violations of international human rights
in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Similar to the charters of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, the charter of the Yugoslav Tribunal
provides for the punishment of specific crimes that are firmly based in
international law. Therefore, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals
establish a precedent for the UN to follow and justify its formation of the
Yugoslav Tribunal.
C. International Conventions and International Criminal Law
While also leading to the convictions of major war criminals, the
trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo after World War II had another, more
important underlying achievement; they laid the foundation for principles
of international law regarding war crimes. '" The UN General
Assembly directed the UN International Law Commission to formulate
the principles of international law that were recognized in the London
Charter and in the judgment of the IMT at Nuremberg.' Among
other things, these principles held perpetrators of international crimes
177. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, supra note 92.
178. See Harris, supra note 169, at 249. Other war crimes proceedings also have applied the
rules laid down by the IMT at Nuremberg, including United States tribunals and French and British
tribunals that tried German war criminals. Id.
179. Hodgson, supra note 68. General Tojo was one of the seven leaders hung. Id.
180. See Bruce W. Nelan, Crime Without Punishment; The U.S. Has Charged Yugoslav Leaders
With Atrocities in Bosnia, But the Criminals May Never be Brought to Justice. Does the West Have
the Will to Follow Through?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1993, at 21.
181. G.A. Res. 177, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 111-12 (1947). In addition, the Commission was
directed to prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind. Id.
The General Assembly had previously affirmed these principles, known as the Nuremberg
Principles, as international law. See Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 5th
Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950) [hereinafter Nuremberg Principles]. In
addition, principles in the Nuremberg IMT Charter were built into the UN Charter, which declares:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
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individually responsible for their acts" and were applied in the trials
of Nazi civilian, government, and military leaders at Nuremberg."s3
These principles formed the basis of the Statute of the Yugoslav Tribunal
and will likewise be applied in any trial against war criminals in
Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, any case against Milosevic or others figures in the
Yugoslav war would rest upon grave breaches of international
agreements. " For instance, the 1907 Hague Convention protects
prisoners of war and prohibits attacks on undefended civilian targets.85
The shelling of towns and villages and the pillage and wanton destruction
of property in the former Yugoslavia are all violations of this
Convention.186 The basic principles of the Hague Convention were
expanded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which established strict
guidelines for the treatment of prisoners of war"8 and civilians caught
in war zones." Generally, these two Geneva Conventions require that
all persons not actively taking part in hostilities must be treated
humanely. 18 9 More specifically, the Geneva Conventions prohibit the
following acts with respect to persons not actively involved in a conflict:
(a) violence to life and persons, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel
treatment, and torture; (b) the taking of hostages; and (c) outrages upon
personal dignity, including humiliating and degrading treatment. "
The mass killings, beatings, rapes, and imprisonment of civilians in
182. See Nuremberg Principles, supra note 181, at 11; G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. GAOR, IstSess.
at 188, U.N. Doc. A/46/Add.1 (1946).
183. Frank Lawrence, Note, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 397, 398 (1989). See The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (1946).
184. See Ron Masland & Margaret Garrard Warner, Will There Be 'A Second Nureniberg',
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 36.
185. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
186. Id. arts. 25, 28, 36 Stat. at 2302-03, 1 Bevans at 648-49. Specifically, Article 25 of the
Convention provides, "The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited." Id. Article 28 states, "The pillage of
a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited." Id. For information on the crimes that
have been committed in the former Yugoslavia, see Hodgson, supra note 68; Leopold, supra note
64.
187. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 62, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
188. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 62, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
189. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 62, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 136, 138; Fourth Geneva. Convention, supra note 62, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3520, 75
U.N.T.S. at 288, 290.
190. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 62, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 136, 138; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 62, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3518, 3520, 75
U.N.T.S. at 288, 290.
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concentration camps under appalling conditions are all direct violations
of these conventions.191
In addition, the 1948 Convention Against Genocide bans certain acts
committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethical, racial or religious group" and requires the UN to take
appropriate action to prevent and suppress acts of genocide. 1" The
policy of ethnic cleansing," ethnically motivated massacres, mass
rapes of Muslim women, and the expulsion of civilians in the former
Yugoslavia all violate the Convention Against Genocide because they are
ethnically and religiously motivated acts."9 As evidenced by these
conventions, there is ample precedent under international law for
prosecuting those responsible for the heinous crimes being committed in
the former Yugoslavia.
V. Effectiveness of the International Tribunal in Prosecuting
Violations of International Law in the Former Yugoslavia
A. Benefits of the Tribunal
When the victorious allied powers established the IMT at
Nuremberg, they reaffirmed an ancient and peremptory principle of law:
no crime without punishment.'95 While international law and public
opinion condemn war crimes, the perpetrators of these crimes more often
than not go unpunished." The most glaring recent example of the
need for an international criminal court arises from the commission of
massive crimes against humanity in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia." If the Tribunal is successful, the trials will provide a
191. Vote on War Crimes Court, supra note 61; Leopold, supra note 64; Nelan, supra note 180.
192. Convention Against Genocide, supra note 63, arts. II, VII, 78 U.N.T.S. at 280, 282, 28
I.L.M. at 763-66. The Convention prohibits genocide, which includes killing or causing serious
bodily harm to members of a group and deliberately inflicting on a group conditions intended to
bring about its physical destruction. Id.
193. Ethnic cleansing is defined as the forced removal of people from their homes because of
their religious or ethnic background. Nebehey, supra note 2.
194. See generally Hodgson, supra note 68; Leopold supra note 64; Mark Heinrich, U.N. Says
Bosnian War Criminals Could Dodge Capture, Reuter Libr. Rep., Apr. 25, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT'L File.
195. Beres, supra note 91, at 675.
196. The Rules of War, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 2, 1993, at 17. An ad hoc tribunal is
preferred to a permanent tribunal for the prosecution of war criminals because war crimes are
committed in divergent contexts, making a permanent court too inflexible. Id.
197. Benjamin B. Ferencz, An International Criminal Code and Court: Where They Stand and
Where They're Going, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 375, 396 (1992) [hereinafter An International
Criminal Court].
12 DICK. J. INT'L L. SPRING 1994
measure of justice in the former Yugoslavia and accountability for crimes
against humanity."
According to human rights groups, the utility of the Tribunal
reaches far beyond the trial itself. First, the investigations the
Commission of Experts performs will create and preserve a historical
record of the events in the former Yugoslavia.' Second, the
investigations of war crimes will help defuse ethnic tensions in the region
and ease group hatred by individualizing guilt.2' Finally, the
indictments alone will be sanctions against the accused, turning these
individuals into political pariahs and effectively forcing them to remain
in the country.201
Some claim that another benefit of setting up an international
criminal court is that it will resolve the dilemma of a "victors' justice,"
evident at the Nuremberg trials, since the trials will be conducted by
neutral parties.' Others, however, argue that any international court
will impose the justice of the victors. Advocates of the Tribunal respond
that even if the Tribunal imposes a victors' justice, if this is the view of
the majority of humanity, the trials are performed in a fair manner, and
the Tribunal proves to be a deterrent to potential criminals, that
complaint may be inconsequential.'
B. Limitations of the Tribunal
Despite its advantages, the Tribunal faces formidable legal, practical
and political complications that may result in the Tribunal being largely
ineffectual.2"n First, in order for the Tribunal to operate successfully,
the court must secure jurisdiction over the political leaders responsible
for many of the atrocities. One significant problem in obtaining
jurisdiction over any accused is that the suspects are not in the custody
of the UN as the Nazi leaders were in the custody of the Allies who
198. Aryeh Neier, Judgment in Sarajevo? For the Serb's Victims, a War Crimes Tribunal Is the
Last Hope, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1993, at C3.
199. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Where's the War Crime Court, WASH. POST, July 30, 1993, at A21.
This historical record will individualize what is too often seen as collective guilt. Id.
200. Julie Mertus, Evidence Must Be Gathered Now to Prosecute Balkan War Crimes Proof of
Wrongdoing Is Vanishing and Witnesses Scattering While the U.N. Discusses and Dithers,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 2, 1993, at A23.
201. Id. An indictment combined with an arrest warrant would subject an individual to
immediate detention if the accused left the boundaries of the state. Id.
202. Hodgson, supra note 68.
203. Id.
204. Ian Black, UN Lays Plans for War Crimes Trials - Bosnia, GUARDIAN, May 26, 1993,
at 8.
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occupied Germany. 205 The UN forces in Yugoslavia do not have the
authority to arrest suspects and voluntary cooperation seems
unlikely.2' In addition, Yugoslavia has already declared it will
not comply with extradition demands. 2°  Unless the criminals leave
their countries, there is little hope of bringing those accused of violating
humanitarian law to trial.2°'
One solution to the jurisdiction problem might be to execute detailed
indictments against those individuals who are principally responsible for
the war crimes. Although only a few suspects may actually be brought
to trial, even one conviction would have a great impact on the
international community because it would prove the validity of the
Tribunal's goals. 1 Madeline Albright, U.S. Ambassador to the UN,
asserted that although it may be difficult to bring suspects to trial, once
the prosecutor issues indictments, these individuals would become
"international pariahs."211 In addition, sanctions could be imposed on
a state that harbors war criminals until the suspects are turned over for
prosecution.212
Second, the threat of prosecution of major political leaders may be
bargained away as part of a peace settlement in the Balkans. 13 The
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims may grant each other political absolution in
order to reach a peace agreement. 4  Indeed, some opponents to the
creation of the Tribunal believe that the UN should focus on ending the
war and that attempting to prosecute political leaders will impede the
peace settlement process. 5
205. Vote on War Crimes Court, supra note 61. Perhaps more importantly, the Serbs are
currently winning the Yugoslav war and there has never even been an attempt to prosecute the
victors of a war. Mertus, supra note 200.
206. Worsnip, supra note 61.
207. The name Yugoslavia now refers to the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. See supra text
accompanying notes 34 and 35.
208. Black, supra note 204.
209. The Rules of War, supra note 196.
210. Id.
211. Leopold, supra note 64. According to Albright, 'international pariah" means that the
accused individual may be able to hide within the borders of Serbia or parts of Bosnia or Croatia,
but will be imprisoned for the rest of their lives within their own land. Id.; See S.C. Res. 827,
supra note 3 (obligating all UN members to assist the Tribunal by handing over accused persons).
212. Mertus, supra note 200.
213. Masland & Warner, supra note 184. Some diplomats claim that the Tribunal is only a
bargaining chip in the peace negotiations. Mertus, supra note 200.
214. Rosenfeld, supra note 199.
215. See Neier, supra note 198. Some believe that if the price for peace is permitting leaders
to grant each other immunity from prosecution, it should be paid. Id. Others, however, assert that
absolution should not be granted because there is no provision for the forgiveness of war crimes in
international law. Id.
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Third, as a practical matter, documenting war crimes in the Balkans
is far more difficult than building a case against the Nazis was.216  At
Nuremberg, much of the evidence was obtained from captured German
High Command files, but no such documentation is available in
Yugoslavia. 7  Although it is possible to identify massive
victimization, it is extremely difficult to establish the chains of command
and command responsibility.218  This presents an obstacle to
prosecuting leading figures who ordered subordinates to commit violent
acts.219 In addition, evidence of war crime is disappearing daily as
survivors are scattering across the globe.22 Unless the international
community acts now, any elaborate legal machinery developed to try war
crimes will fail because the evidence needed will be unobtainable. 2
Fourth and finally, factors including significant costs, limited
resources, and large time commitments weigh against the success of the
Tribunal. The Commission of Experts does not have the proper staff or
resources to interview witnesses and gather evidence. 2  The
Commission and the UN have been forced to rely upon the aid of other
international organizations to compile forensic evidence, collect bullets,
and interview survivors." Surprisingly, there have even been
accusations that Britain and France, both permanent members of the UN,
have not been giving their support to the Commission by collecting
evidence.'
C. Alternative Remedies
Not only does the Tribunal have its procedural limitations, but there
are many who contest the creation of an ad hoc criminal tribunal for the
prosecution of international humanitarian law violations. Some
opponents of the Tribunal in Yugoslavia suggest that there are other
viable options available to rectify the situation. While these alternative
216. Masland & Warner, supra note 184.
217. Worsnip, supra note 61.
218. Vote on War Crimes Court, supra note 61.
219. Heinrich, supra note 194.
220. Mertus, supra note 200.
221. Id.
222. Roy Gutman, War Crime Unit Hasn't a Clue, UN Setup Seems Designed to Fail,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 4, 1993, at 8. Rumors have been spread that "authoritative persons" in the UN
instructed the chairman of the UN panel not to pursue convictions of Serbian political leaders. Id.
223. Mertus, supra note 200.
224. Patrick Bishop, Netherlands: International -Britain 'Snubbed War Crimes Team', DALLY
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 4, 1993, at 16. Professor Kalshoven, the former Chairman of the Commission
of Experts, resigned because of the European nations' lack of cooperation. Id.
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means of redress may be appropriate in other circumstances, they are
inadequate for the purposes of punishing criminals in the Yugoslav war.
One alternative proposed is the prosecution of criminals in the
national courts of states where war criminals are found. This seems a
dubious solution in Yugoslavia because the proponents of the policy of
"ethnic cleansing" are currently winning the war. As the individuals
committing the crimes gain power in the region, the probability that
domestic courts could bring them to trial decreases.225 However,
Germany may be leading the way toward prosecution of the former
Yugoslavia's war criminals living in other countries. In February 1994,
Germany's federal prosecutor's office arrested a Serb living in Germany
and charged him with assisting in genocide for torturing and mistreating
prisoners in a Yugoslav detention camp. 6 The Serb suspect may be
prosecuted in a German court if enough evidence is obtained. 27
Another option suggested is the prosecution of war criminals in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague. The ICJ, however,
does not have penal or criminal jurisdiction and is, therefore, an
unsuitable forum for the redress of war crimes"8 Even if the UN
expanded the ICJ's jurisdiction to include criminal matters, the consent
of the parties is required for the ICJ's decision to be bindingY 9 There
is little probability that a defendant would consent to the jurisdiction of
the ICJ. As a final limitation, the Statute of the ICJ precludes
prosecution of individuals and only grants standing to States.31 Thus,
the ICJ is not an available remedy for the prosecution of individuals for
war crimes. While the Yugoslav Tribunal has its limitations, it seems to
be the most viable option since it is unlikely that either of these
alternatives could effectively remedy human rights abuses in the former
Yugoslavia.
225. Neier, supra note 198.
226. Michael Christie, Germany: Kinkel Says Will Pursue Bosnia War Crimes Suspects, Reuter
Libr. Rep., Feb. 24, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT'L File. Dusko Tadic was
arrested under a law that permits suspects to be tried in Germany for violations of international law
committed abroad. Id.- Germany is also investigating 50 other Serb suspects that are rumored to
have taken refuge in Germany. Id.
227. Id.
228. Beres, supra note 91, at 687.
229. Making the Case Against Saddam Hussein, LEGAL TIMT4Es, Feb. 4, 1991, at 10.
230. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
231. Michael D. Greenberg, Note, Creating an International Criminal Court, 10 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 119, 121 (1992).
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VI. Conclusion
Despite good intentions and expanding commitments, efforts to
maintain peace in the post-cold war world are failing. 2 The UN has
dispatched troops in Bosnia and Croatia to keep a peace that does not
exist, with inadequate arms and rules of engagement that prevent them
from halting the bloodshed. 3  The UN simply lacks the commitment,
,organization, training, and money to police today's ethnic conflicts and
civil wars.234
Undoubtedly, the Serbs as well as the Croats and Muslims have
committed grave violations of human rights law for which the
perpetrators should be prosecuted. The victims of these horrendous
crimes deserve reparations. The Council's Chapter VII powers -
specifically Article 39 - and the Council's actions in other conflicts both
indicate that the Council may create an ad hoc criminal tribunal as a
measure aimed at restoring "international peace and security."
Despite many public declarations in support of criminal trials in the
case of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, those who had the power to act did
not."3  Saddam Hussein escaped punishment for committing crimes
similar to those for which the Nazi leaders were tried at Nuremberg.236
It is ironic that such a great military victory was followed by a human
rights disaster.37 Admittedly, public pressure for the trial of major
Nazi war criminals in Germany was enormous, but the lesson to be
learned from the IMT is that a viable code and court can be created in
a very short time if there is the political will to do so.23
At this point, the UN has elected a prosecutor239 and the judges
to serve on the Tribunal, but not much else has been done to put the
judicial process in motion." Not a single case file has been created,
nor has a single defendant been named."' The Tribunal's progress has
232. Trimble, supra note 57, at 45.
233. Id. at 47.
234. Id. at 45.
235. Ferencz, supra note 116, at 727.
236. Harris, supra note 169, at 231.
237. Ferencz, supra note 116, at 727.
238. An International Criminal Court, supra note 197, at 383.
239. Andrew Kelly, U.N. Convenes Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, Amid Doubts, Reuter
European Community Rep., Nov. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT'L File. The
Tribunal's prosecutor is Venezuelan Attorney General Ramon Escovar Salom. Id. Legal experts
anticipate that Escovar Salom wili face significant obstacles in bringing the suspects before the
Tribunal. Id.
240. Id. On November 17, 1993, the UN Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal held its inaugural
session and swore in the 11 judges of the Tribuhial. Id.
241. Mertus, supra note 200. A number of leaders have been named as suspects, including
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been slowed by the same lack of political will that has crippled other UN
efforts in the region. 2
It is now generally recognized that an effective international criminal
code and court are essential components of a civilized world order. 3
There are those, however, who believe that it was not proper for the UN
to create the Tribunal in the case of Yugoslavia. The Tribunal obviously
faces significant problems and limitations that may impede its success
and prevent justice from being served for the countless victims of the
Yugoslav conflict. Nevertheless, the creation of the Tribunal is not
without its benefits. Evidence of the blatant violations of international
law in the former Yugoslavia is being compiled and documented and,
thus, preserved. If nothing else is gained, maybe the evidence compiled
will serve to admonish present and future generations of the evil that we
are capable of manifesting.
Barbara M. Tocker
Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and Bosnian Serb
General Ratko Mladic. See Black, supra note 204; Vote on War Crimes Court, supra note 61; John
F. Bums, Key Figures May Elude Bosnia War Crimes Trial, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Apr. 27,
1993, at A9.
242. Mertus, supra note 200. The UN has issued baseless declarations denouncing acts of
aggression, threatening counter-attacks, and declaring "safe havens" in the former Yugoslavia. Id.
243. An International Criminal Court, supra note 197, at 399.

